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A political economy model is presented that proposes an effective explanation as to why national 
allocation plans in the emissions trading scheme of the European Union have taken the form they have.  
The influence of the national bureaucracy, which is omitted in the majority of the related political 
economy literature, is shown to be potentially significant and costly – particularly through its interaction 
with the influence of the affected industrialists.  The analysis suggests that the role of the national 
bureaucracy in the design of environmental policy should be carefully considered and structured, and 
suggests an avenue of potentially important and fruitful future research. 
 
Key words: Lobbying; political economy; environmental policy; common agency models; bureaucracy; 
emissions trading 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The emissions trading scheme of the European Union (EU), here-forth referred to simply as the 
Scheme, was launched in January 2005 and is now the most extensive cap-and-trade1 scheme in 
the world.  Now in its second phase (2008-12), it comprises installations from the highest carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emitting activities2 in the EU: together accounting for approximately 45 per cent of the 
EU’s CO2 emissions (Egenhofer, 2007).  A number of European Union Allowances, each permitting 
the holder to emit one tonne of carbon, are annually allocated to the installations to be used to cover 
current or future emissions, or to trade with others in the Scheme. 
The allocation of allowances is largely left to the discretion of EU member states.  Prior to 
each phase of the Scheme, and based on European Commission advice (EC, 2003) and guidelines 
(EU, 2003 and EC, 2004), each member state is required to submit a national allocation plan to the 
Commission outlining its allocation.  The Commission acts as verifier of these plans, possessing the 
power to insist on changes when necessary. 
It is widely acknowledged that environmental policy design can be explained by the 
interaction of interest group influences; and the tools of modern political economy have been 
employed to do precisely this (see, for example, Yu 2005).  However, although the environmental 
and economic consequences of the Scheme’s allocation plans in both Phases One and Two have 
been subject to considerable analysis (see, amongst others, Åhman and Holmgren 2006; Betz and 
                                                 
1 A cap-and-trade scheme is one in which the authority determines total output (the cap) and the participants subsequently 
determine the distribution through trade.  In this case the output is carbon emissions. 
 
2 The activities included in the second phase of the scheme are those producing: (i) energy; (ii) non-ferrous metals; (iii) pulp and 
paper; (iv) lime; (v) cement; and (vi) chemicals. 
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Sato 2006; Kemfert et al. 2006; Neuhoff et al. 2006a; Neuhoff et al. 2006b; Sijm et al. 2006; Smale 
et al. 2006; and Kettner et al. 2007), there is little in the literature by way of analysis of why the 
plans have taken the form they have.  In addition, the large majority of the existing political economy 
analysis focuses on the roles of only three of the key players (using game theoretic terminology): 
the government, participants and environmental groups; thereby omitting the influence of the 
national bureaucracy.  Svendson (2003) is a notable exception to this.  This is an important 
omission from, and weakness of, existing analyses because national bureaucracies often have two, 
potentially significant, effects on policy design: (i) as a conduit through which other players indirectly 
lobby the government; and (ii) as an affected interest group in its own right – being the body that 
actually implements policies. 
 The intention of the present paper is to address these two weaknesses in the literature.  
Firstly, to analyse why allocation plans in the Scheme have been designed the way they have; and 
secondly, to incorporate the important role of the national bureaucracy into such analysis.  
Regarding the first of these, particular attention is given to the following aspects of plan design: (i) 
the division of the necessary abatement burden (necessary in terms of satisfying pre-existing 
burden-sharing agreement commitments3) between the trading sector (composed of the activities) 
in the Scheme and the rest of the economy; and (ii) the extent to which allowance allocation is 
differentiated according to the different characteristics of the activities in the trading sector.  The 
next section reviews the actual process employed by member states to design allocation plans, 
along with the key characteristics of the final designs, which are then used to inform and evaluate 
subsequent analysis.  Sections 3 through 5 present a common agency model specifically 
constructed for this particular analysis that is then used, along with marginal analysis, to address the 
two intentions of this paper.  Sections 6 and 7 present a discussion of the results and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
2. DESIGNING ALLOCATION PLANS IN REALITY 
 
“The elaboration of the [national allocation plan] is a political process, 
whose outcome may not be ‘rational’ from an economist’s perspective, but 
the result of the interaction between several actors and the balancing of 
conflicting interactive variables and criteria” (del Río 2007: 209) 
 
In designing allocation plans for Phase One of the Scheme, most member states delegated the 
generation of design recommendations to different departments within their national bureaucracies 
at, broadly speaking, three levels of responsibility.  Environmental departments usually took the 
lead; with the departments for the economy and for taxation accepting a supporting position; and 
                                                 
3 When signing the international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions developed at Kyoto, the EU-15 (as they then 
were) collectively agreed to reduce emissions by eight per cent by 2008-12 relative to 1990 levels.  This abatement burden was 
shared across the fifteen states in the burden-sharing agreement.  The UK, for instance, committed itself to reducing emissions 
by 12.5 per cent from 1990 levels by 2008/12; whereas Luxembourg accepted the greatest relative burden (28 per cent) and 
Portugal the least (it could expand emissions by 27 per cent). 
 
 3
with representatives from other interested departments adopting peripheral roles (see Table 1 for 
details from three member states).  Lead departments usually organised inter-departmental groups 
to coordinate the design process, and often commissioned external consultants to provide advice: 
for example, the Klein Institute in the case of Spain.  Non-public working groups were organised to 
survey the views within the trading sector (Zapfel, 2007), but usually environmental groups were 
excluded from these meetings.  In the UK there were four major consultations during the design 
period (Harrison and Radov, 2007), covering aspects such as general allowance allocation 
methodology, sector growth rates, and the new entrants’ reserve 4 .  The resulting design 
recommendations were then presented to governments, which ultimately made the final decisions 
regarding the allocation plan to be submitted to the Commission for review following their own 
stakeholder consultation period (a requirement of Annex III of the Directive: EC 2003). 
 
Level of 
Responsibility 
UK Denmark Spain*
 
Lead 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs; and the 
Environment Agency 
Ministries of the Environment 
(specifically the Environment 
Protection Agency), and of 
Transport and Energy (specifically 
the Danish Energy Authority) 
Ministry of the Environment 
(specifically the Spanish 
Climate Change Office) 
Supporting Department of Trade and 
Industry 
Ministries of Finance and Taxation Ministry of Economics 
Peripheral Other interested 
departments 
Other interested departments Other interested departments 
Source Harrison and Radov (2007) Pederson (2007) del Río (2007) 
Table 1: Allocation plan design responsibilities in the UK, Denmark and Spain 
* The responsibilities for the Spanish recommendations changed due to lobbying and change of government.  The reported 
responsibilities are those in existence upon submission of the Spanish allocation plan. 
 
  Lobbying, both direct and indirect (Yu, 2005), was important throughout the design process.  
Representatives from the trading sectors (usually in the form of sector associations) were 
concerned that the abatement burden imposed on them should not be excessive: particularly when 
compared to those in other member states.  Many trading sector representatives challenged the 
proposed allocations to their activities based on the projected sector growth rates employed and the 
calculation of contributions to the new entrants’ reserves.  Many also argued that there should be 
greater differentiation of allowance allocation so that specific characteristics of activities would be 
taken into greater consideration. 
 In Spain, the trading sector adopted two clear approaches to lobbying.  It lobbied the 
government directly; but also engaged in indirect lobbying: publishing complaints in the general 
press as well as in economic journals.  Spain is also a good example of how this lobbying was not 
always straightforward.  Take the Spanish electricity sector, for instance.  It comprises three main 
producers, together accounting for some 90 per cent of the domestic electricity market: (i) Iberdrola: 
                                                 
4 The new entrants’ reserve is a bank of allowances set aside for any new installations that are subsequently required to be in 
the Scheme.  The extent and conditions of the reserves vary considerably across member states. 
 4
the cleanest producer of energy due to its investment in renewables; (ii) Unión Fenosa: which has 
the greatest greenhouse gas emissions per kilowatt-hour; and (iii) Endesa: which lies in between the 
other two regarding carbon emissions.  Iberdrola advocated a high abatement burden to be placed 
on the trading sector (advocating the allocation of the equivalent of 70 Mt CO2 of allowances to the 
sector), whereas the other two inevitably advocated a more lenient abatement burden: 96 MT CO2 
(del Río, 2007). 
 The UK is perhaps the clearest example of the effects of lobbying during the government’s 
consultation period.  The draft plan proposed the inclusion of 867 installations divided into 14 activity 
sub-divisions.  The final plan submitted to the Commission included 1054 installations in 52 sub-
divisions.  Further complexity was added due to the influence of lobbying for greater differentiation 
in the allocation of allowances.  Three rules (the baseline, commissioning and rationalisation rules), 
adjusting the base periods to be used for allowance allocation, were added to offset any competitive 
disadvantage caused by the original formula (Harrison and Radov, 2007).  Similar can also be said 
of Spain.  The consultants recommended an allocation of 22.148 million allowances each year, but 
at least partly due to trading sector lobbying, the final allocation chosen by the government 
amounted to 22.5 million (del Río, 2007). 
  When considering these influences, it should be stressed that the ultimate result of the 
design processes in the separate member states was the achievement of a functioning emissions 
trading scheme: a feat that Grubb and Neuhoff (2006) suggest is remarkable considering the 
historical success of pan-European environmental policy implementation.  However, this 
achievement came at a cost: a divergence from the economically efficient design – which in this 
case should be defined as the minimisation of total abatement and administration costs given a level 
of imposed abatement.  The Scheme is significantly more complicated, and comprises many more 
administrative rules (Zapfel, 2007), than economists had intended: particularly the hyper-
differentiation of activities to ensure that specific industrial circumstances are considered (Ellerman 
et al., 2007).  The Scheme has also tended to impose a much more lenient abatement burden on 
the trading sector than is economically efficient.  Figure 1 compares the abatement burdens, in 
terms of the percentage reduction in CO2 emissions (relative to 1990 levels) required of the trading 
sectors, imposed in the plans for Phase Two of a selection of member states with those that would 
be proportional to the national Kyoto commitments. 5  A position above the line of proportionality 
implies that the trading sector is bearing a relatively large abatement burden compared to that 
required of the whole economy; whereas a position beneath it implies that the emissions of the 
trading sector are being subsidised by other sectors in the economy.  As Figure 1 clearly illustrates, 
for a sample of member states that can be considered representative of the EU-25, most member 
states treated their trading sectors leniently.  Böhringer et al. (2005 and 2006) and Peterson (2006) 
argue that an abatement burden for the trading sector that is less than proportional to the national 
                                                 
5 The selection was enforced by data limitations.  Only those member states that had published the summary tables of their 
Phase Two allocation plans on Eurostat are included.  Those member states that have a negative national abatement burden 
(Greece and Slovakia) have an emissions target relative to that necessary for it to achieve its Kyoto agreements that allows it to 
actually increase emissions. 
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abatement burden is economically inefficient as the trading sector is likely to have a lower marginal 
cost of abatement than the non-trading sector. 
50 
Figure 1: The extent of the trading sector abatement burden in Phase Two relative to 
national Kyoto commitments (Data source: Eurostat)6
 
  Overall, then, there are two salient characteristics of the allocation plans that have been 
actually implemented: (i) they are more sophisticated, and so have a greater degree of 
differentiation in the allocation of allowances, than expected; and (ii) they tend to impose an 
abatement burden on the trading sector that is more lenient than economists had hoped for.  These 
are the two design characteristics that this paper presents an explanation for. 
 
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME 
 
The model takes the form of a common agency model as developed by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) from the work of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), that is most closely associated with that 
presented by Yu (2005). 
 Allocation plan design is modelled as a three-stage process involving five players (Figure 
2): a structure firmly based on the description of reality in Section 2.  For parsimony it is assumed 
that the responsibility for the generation of design recommendations is delegated to a single 
bureaucratic department. 
 It should be noted that the public, predominantly transport users/providers and households, 
are not modelled as organising an effective lobbying group (even through non-governmental 
                                                 
6 The position of the UK, although surprising, is due to it already having achieved its Kyoto target prior to the start of Phase Two 
and so was actually able to increase its emissions during that Phase. 
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organisations) because they are too numerous: the net marginal benefit to an individual joining the 
lobbying effort is not a sufficient incentive to do so7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model structure 
Trading sector 
Bureaucracy 
Environmental 
groups 
Government
Public 
Stage One Stage Two Stage Three 
Final 
plan 
Result 
Political consideration 
Direct lobbying 
Indirect lobbying 
  
 In stage one, the bureaucracy engages in talks with trading sector representatives in the 
process of generating design recommendations for the government.  The latter compete with one 
another for a favourable plan design largely by providing the bureaucracy with sector growth rates 
and emissions projections.  During this stage, environmental groups indirectly lobby the public to 
obtain support for more ambitious environmental targets – i.e. for a greater abatement burden to be 
imposed on the trading sector.  It should be noted that, in general accordance with the actual design 
processes implemented by the EU member states (see Section 2), environmental groups cannot 
influence the recommendations to be made by the bureaucracy as they were usually not invited to 
the working-group tables. In stage two, the bureaucracy reports its recommendations to the 
government and then, along with the trading sector as a whole and the environmental groups, 
lobbies the government to influence the final design. 
 The bureaucracy, which is usually omitted from political economy analysis of environmental 
policy, has its own interest in the design of the plan.  Ultimately, it is the body that will implement 
and monitor the Scheme and so rationally wants to secure its future responsibility (and with it the 
job-security and status of its workforce) for the Scheme by increasing the administration workload it 
requires (this is based on the assertions of Svendsen, 2003).  In practice, this means increasing the 
                                                 
7 This follows the standard argument as to why it is not rational for a given individual to vote in national elections, but in this case 
the rationality is not overcome by cultural factors such as the perceived importance of voting (see Olson, 1965). 
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degree to which allowance allocation is differentiated as greater differentiation necessitates greater 
analysis and processing.  However, this motivation is gradually ameliorated by the fear of being 
unable to cope with too much complexity.  If WB is the gross welfare of the bureaucracy before the 
expenditure on lobbying has been deducted; d is the degree of differentiation in the plan; and d  is 
the degree of differentiation that the bureaucracy wants established: 
B
B
)( ddWW BBB −= , with 
0)(' >− ddW BB  and 0)('' <− ddW BB .  The welfare function of the bureaucracy is structured in terms 
of the absolute divergence of d from d  because any divergence, in either direction, serves to 
reduce its welfare.  
B
 The trading sector rationally seeks two characteristics for the plan: (i) the overall 
minimisation of the abatement burden that it bears in order to minimise the competitive 
disadvantage caused; and (ii) the maximisation of the degree to which the allowance allocation is 
differentiated so that individual industrial characteristics are accounted for.  If WT is the gross 
welfare of the trading sector before the deduction of lobbying expenses; b is the abatement burden 
imposed; and d is again the degree of differentiation, then: , with , 
,  and . 
),( dbWW TT = 0)(' <bWT
0)('' >bWT 0)(' >dWT 0)('' <dWT
 The environmental groups are assumed to simply want the maximisation of the abatement 
burden imposed on the trading sector, so that environmental benefits are maximised.  Using similar 
notation to that above: , with  and .  )(bWW EE = 0)(' >bWE 0)('' <bWE
 The public, which only influences the final design of the plan through governmental 
consideration of the potential political damage the plan causes, is concerned that: (i) the abatement 
burden imposed on the trading sector be balanced; and (ii) the degree to which allowance allocation 
is differentiated within the plan be restrained.  The justification of the second of these concerns is 
the more straightforward of the two – greater differentiation can be assumed to necessitate greater 
expenditure from the public coffers and so inevitably means a greater financial burden being 
imposed on the public.  The first of these concerns is more complicated as it is composed of two 
conflicting pressures.  The public is assumed to be aware that the government has, as part of the 
Kyoto Protocol at the very least8, committed the country to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
by a certain percentage of 1990 levels by 2008-12.  A lenient plan that imposes a slight abatement 
burden on the trading sector, then, necessitates greater abatement of transport and household 
emissions – abatement that will hit the publics’ purse directly.  This, along with environmental 
concerns that are encouraged by environmental groups, motivates the public to desire a heavy 
abatement burden for the trading sector.  However, this motivation is moderated by the knowledge 
that a heavier abatement burden for the trading sector will lead to higher retail prices of its produce 
– higher energy prices, for example.  The public, believing that the abatement burden imposed on 
the trading sector should be reasonable, will desire a certain burden (bP) that reflects this and will 
view any deviation from this publicly-optimal burden in a negative light.  Overall, then, and again 
                                                 
8 Since the Kyoto Protocol separate member states have made their commitments more ambitious.  The UK, for example, 
committed itself as part of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% (relative to 1990 levels) by 
2008-12.  However, its current public commitment now amounts to a 20% reduction. 
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using the notation from above: ),( dbbWW PPP −= , with 0)(' <−bbW PP , 0)('' >−bbW PP ,  
and . 
0)(' <dWP
0)('' >dWP
 The trading sector and the public are both players with multiple goals – they are both 
concerned with both the abatement burden to be imposed on the trading sector and the degree to 
which allowance allocation is differentiated to take account of the specific characteristics of the 
different activities.  It is important to stress at this stage that these variables do not enter their 
welfare functions in a simple additive way.  As noted above, both have a diminishing effect on 
welfare, but they are also perfect complements.  The negative opinion of the public, for example, is 
only allayed by both a reduction in the deviation of the abatement burden imposed on the trading 
sector and a reduction in the degree to which allowance allocation is differentiated – a reduction in 
only one of them does not reduce the political damage caused.  Likewise, for the trading sector, 
welfare is only increased if there is both a reduction in the abatement burden it will bear and an 
increase in allowance allocation.  This assumption, which may not accurately reflect reality, has 
been made for the mathematical tractability of the model but does not significantly alter the results 
from the analysis. 
 Finally, the government wants to maximise the welfare that it acquires from the combined 
direct lobbying efforts of the bureaucracy, the trading sector and the environmental groups; but 
whilst minimising the negative opinions about the plans design amongst the public, and the political 
damage that provokes.  This is formally outlined in Section 4. 
   
4. DIRECT COMPETITION FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
 
Following stage one, the bureaucracy, the trading sector and the environmental groups, taking the 
interests of the other players as given, each offer the government a scheme of policy-contingent 
political contributions.  These schedules, which are continuous, outline the political contribution for 
every possible combination of the abatement burden imposed on the trading sector and the degree 
to which the plan is differentiated.  These contributions are usually interpreted in the literature as 
taking a monetary form, but in this situation should perhaps be interpreted more broadly as being 
political support, which may or may not involve financial donations.  These contributions are 
determined by the effect of the plan on welfare, and so if CB, CB T and CE denote the contributions 
from the bureaucracy, the trading sector and the environmental groups, respectively: 
,  and , with the first and second derivatives being of the 
same signs as for the welfare effects in Section 3. 
)( ddCC BBB −= ),( dbCC TT = )(bCC EE =
It is important to note that the although the total effectiveness of the political contribution 
schedules rise as the total contributions offered is increased, the effectiveness of a marginal 
increase in the total contributions offered is characterised by diminishing returns – the offering of a 
limited political contribution schedule by a new player has a greater influence on the government 
than if those contributions were added to the more generous schedule of an existing player, even 
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though the latter will inevitably have a greater overall influence.   Each player designs its 
contribution schedule to maximise its own net welfare: NWi = Wi - Ci where i = B, T and E. 
It is assumed that each player has an exogenous endowment of resources that it can use 
for lobbying, which is denoted by Yi.  For the generality of the results from the model, it is assumed 
that each of the three players able to engage in lobbying have the same endowment, i.e. YB = YB T = 
YE.  The realism of this assumption is addressed in Section 6.  The bureaucracy uses all of its 
resources for directly lobbying the government in stage two; whereas the trading sector and the 
environmental groups have to allocate their resources between lobbying indirectly in stage one 
(denoted LT and LE respectively) and lobbying directly in stage two.  It should be stressed here, 
though, that the actual expenditure of these resources on direct lobbying is determined by the 
policy-contingent political contribution schedules submitted to the government in stage two.  As the 
amount of resources allocated to indirect lobbying is increased, the amount available to offer in the 
political contribution schedule falls.  Taking the environmental groups as an example; if they allocate 
a high proportion of their resources to indirect lobbying, they will simply have fewer resources to 
offer the government in stage two and so their contribution schedule will necessarily be less 
generous throughout. 
A benevolent government would set the abatement burden imposed on the trading sector 
and the degree of differentiation in the plan such that climate policy as a whole is cost efficient – 
such that the necessary carbon abatement is implemented in the least costly fashion.  In this model 
it is assumed that the government determines these policy variables such that its own welfare, 
reflected by the objective function in (1), is maximised: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ),(,)( dbbDbC
Y
LYdbC
Y
LYddCG pE
E
EE
T
T
TTB
B −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=  (1) 
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) the focus is 
on truthful contribution schedules, which pay the excess of a player’s gross welfare over a given 
reservation level9.  It is assumed that the reservation levels of welfare (denoted by ri where i = B, T 
and E), which are constants that distribute the rent between the government and the lobby group, 
are set optimally and incorporate the resources they expect to spend on lobbying, and so 
],0max[ iii rWC −= , where the over-scores denote that the contribution schedules are truthful.  For 
simplicity, the over-scores are omitted in the remainder of the model: it is assumed, for 
mathematical tractability, that schedules are truthful. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium can be characterised by the following lemmas (in 
the appendix of Yu, 2005, the mathematical intuitions underlying these results are presented): 
 
                                                 
9 Truthful contribution schedules everywhere reflect the true preference of lobby groups (Aidt, 1998) and so correctly reflect 
the contributions that the players would make for every given policy choice by the government.  They are employed here 
because the resulting equilibria are coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim and Whinston, 1984).  In a first-price menu 
auction (meaning that bidders, in this case the players, pay their announced offers for the allocation ultimately chosen) a 
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is one in which: (i) there is no strategy less-costly than the equilibrium strategy for each 
player to ensure that the given outcome is chosen; and (ii) there is no alternative self-enforcing Nash equilibrium (meaning 
that players have no incentive to divert from it) that offers Pareto dominating net payoffs to the players.  In other words, 
players working cooperatively would choose the given equilibrium. 
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Lemma 1: Taking the contribution schedules and the reservation levels of welfare for the players as 
given, the equilibrium abatement burden imposed on the trading sector (b*) and the equilibrium 
degree of differentiation in allowance allocation (d*), simultaneously satisfy (2): 
 
b* and d* ( ) ( ) ( )dbbDbW
Y
LYdbW
Y
LYddW pE
E
EE
T
T
TTB
Bdb ,,)(maxarg , −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=  
 
(2) 
 
Lemma 2: The equilibrium levels of political contribution by the three lobbying groups ( )*iC  are given 
by (3), (4) and (5). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ],,[],,[ ****** 111 dbbDbW
Y
LYdbW
Y
LYdbbDbW
Y
LYdbW
Y
LYC PE
E
EE
T
T
TTP
E
E
EE
T
T
TT
B −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= θθθ )   
(3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )],[],[ ***** 222 dbbDbW
Y
LYddWdbbDbW
Y
LYddWC PE
E
EEB
B
P
E
E
EEB
BT −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= θθθ   
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )],,[],,[ ****** 333 dbbDdbW
Y
LYddWdbbDdbW
Y
LYddWC PT
T
TTB
B
P
T
T
TTB
BE −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= θθθ   
(5) 
 
Where θ1 is the combination of b and d that maximises the overall political contributions, net of 
political damage in the eyes of the public, to the government if only the trading sector, the 
environmental groups and the public are considered.  Similarly, θ2 is the combination of b and d that 
maximises the overall political contributions, net of political damage in the eyes of the public, to the 
government if only the bureaucracy, the environmental groups and the public are considered.  
Finally, then, θ3 is the combination of b and d that maximises the overall political contributions, net 
of political damage in the eyes of the public, to the government if only the bureaucracy, the trading 
sector and the public are considered. 
  
Intuitively, Lemma 2 is based logically on the notion that each player i will contribute to the 
government the exact amount that makes the government indifferent between choosing the 
combination {b*,d*} and the combination that would have been chosen if it did not make any 
contributions – this can also be seen as the effectiveness of the direct lobbying of player i.  The 
intuition underlying this is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows how the equilibrium contributions lead 
to the final equilibrium plan designs being determined.  The longer the line representing the 
contribution of a player: the greater its effectiveness.    
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 Figure 3: The intuition underlying the equilibrium results 
Abatement 
burden, b 
Plan differentiation, d 
1 2 
3 
4 
1 = b*, d* 
2 = bθ1, dθ1
3 = bθ2, dθ2     
4 = bθ3, dθ3   
C(T) 
C(B) 
C(E) 
C(T) = Contribution of trading sector  
C(B) = Contribution of bureaucracy 
C(E) = Contribution of environmental groups   
 
From lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium values of b* and d* are simultaneously determined by 
the two first-order conditions in (6) and (7). 
 
( ) 0)()(: '''* =−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − bbDbW
Y
LYbW
Y
LYb PE
E
EE
T
T
TT  
 
(6) 
( ) ( ) 0)(: '''* =−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+− dDdWY LYddWd TT TTBB  
 
(7) 
  
Where  is known as player i’s economic stake in the decision.  A larger , then, means that 
player i has a greater stake in the decision and so will offer more in political contributions at the 
margin to influence the decision.  As 
( ).'iW ( ).'iW
( ).'TW  and ( ).'EW  have been scaled by the proportion of their 
lobbying resources remaining after the indirect lobbying of stage one, these can be interpreted as 
their effective economic stakes in these decisions.  
Before proceeding to the analysis of the indirect lobbying in stage one, it is worth noting the 
following simple and logical propositions from (6) and (7): 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the amount of resources that the trading sector devotes to 
indirect lobbying in Stage One, LT, the smaller its effective economic stake will be in the 
determination of both the degree of differentiation in the allowance allocation of the plan and the 
size of the abatement burden that it will bear.  Ceteris paribus, then, b* will be higher and d* will be 
lower (as and ). 0)(' <bWT 0)(' >dWT
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the amount of resources that the environmental groups 
devote to indirect lobbying in Stage One, LE, the smaller their effective economic stake will be in the 
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determination of the size of the abatement burden that will be imposed on the trading sector.  
Ceteris paribus, then, b* will be lower (as ). 0)(' >bWE
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the bureaucracy’s desired level of differentiation in the 
allowance allocation of the plan, dB, causes its economic stake in that decision to increase and so, 
ceteris paribus, will cause d* to rise (as 0)(' >− ddW BB ). 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in the publicly-optimal abatement burden imposed on the 
trading sector, bP: the greater the damage will be of imposing any lenient abatement burden on the 
trading sector.  Ceteris paribus, then, an increase in bP will cause b* to rise (as 0)(' <−bbW PP ). 
 
5. INDIRECT COMPETITION FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
 
The analysis in Section 4 leads to the final results of the model, but fails to address a number of key 
questions. (i) How do the environmental groups and the trading sector allocate their resources 
between direct and indirect lobbying? (ii) What role does the bureaucracy play in the final design of the 
plan? And, perhaps most importantly as it can be used to test the relevance of the whole model, (iii) 
what is the predicted outcome of the plan?  It is to these questions that the analysis now turns. 
 Both the trading sector and the environmental groups will allocate their resources between 
direct and indirect lobbying such that the total effectiveness of their lobbying is maximised.  In other 
words, they will equate the marginal effectiveness of their direct lobbying with that of their indirect 
lobbying.  Let us take the environmental groups first, as they have a single goal variable and so are 
perhaps the more straightforward of the two. 
 During stage one, the environmental groups lobby the public in order to encourage them to 
demand that a heavier abatement burden be imposed on the trading sector.  As explained in Section 
2, the public demands that this burden be balanced because if it is too lenient, or too heavy, they 
expect the costs that they themselves will have to bear to rise; and so they demand a particular 
abatement burden for the trading sector, bP.  The purpose of the environmental groups’ indirect 
lobbying is to increase this publicly-optimal burden by convincing the public that there will also be 
significant environmental costs that will eventually reduce their standard of living as well. 
 The publicly-optimal abatement burden is, therefore, an additive function of the public’s prior 
belief about what the abatement burden should be, , and the extra burden that they are convinced 
is necessary to offset future environmental costs, , which in turn is a function of the amount of 
resources that the environmental groups devote to this indirect lobbying.  Overall: .  
As noted in Proposition 4, increasing b
Pb0
P
Eb
)(0 E
P
E
PP Lbbb +=
P will, ceteris paribus, raise the equilibrium value of b*, and so is 
an effective strategy for the environmental groups to engage in.  However, it is assumed that further 
increasing bP becomes increasingly difficult as the public increasingly take much more convincing that 
 13
the environmental benefits outweigh the increased retail product prices from the trading sector that 
they fear (and it is also assumed that this effect outweighs the characteristic that 0)('' >−bbW PP ). 
As noted in Proposition 2, increasing the resources devoted to indirect lobbying inevitably 
reduces the generosity of the political contribution schedule offered by the environmental groups to the 
government in stage two, and so will reduce the effectiveness of their direct lobbying.  As this, ceteris 
paribus, causes a reduction in b* they need to equate the marginal effectiveness of the two 
approaches to lobbying in order to maximise their overall influence on the design of the plan. 
 Following from the intuition underlying Lemma 2, particularly (5), the total effectiveness of the 
direct lobbying of the environmental groups is the difference between b* and .  The marginal 
effectiveness of the direct lobbying by the environmental groups (MDE
3θb
E), then, is given by (8), in which 
a marginal increase in the direct lobbying of the environmental groups is represented by a marginal 
decrease in LE. 
 
( )
( )EEE LY
bbMDE −Δ
−Δ= 3
* θ
 
 
(8) 
 
 Similarly, the marginal effectiveness of indirect lobbying by the environmental groups (MIEE) is 
given by (9).  This is complicated by the fact that the effectiveness of this indirect lobbying works 
through the government’s concern about not creating a negative reaction amongst the public.  By 
increasing bP, the environmental groups increase the public’s influence on the government, which is 
given by the difference between b* and , where is the abatement burden that would be 
imposed on the trading sector if the government was not at all concerned about the public. 
4θb 4θb
 
( )[ ]{ }
E
P
E L
bbbDb
MIE Δ
−−Δ=
4* θ
 
 
(9) 
 
The environmental groups will allocate just enough resources to indirect lobbying such that (8) is equal 
to (9).  Both forms of lobbying cause the value of b* to rise – direct lobbying by increasing the political 
contributions from the environmental groups throughout their political contribution schedules and so 
making it beneficial for the government to increase the abatement burden; and indirect lobbying by 
increasing the political damage caused amongst the public by every level of b beneath  (by 
widening the deviation of those from b
Pb0
P).  Crucially, it was assumed in Section 4 that the effectiveness 
of a marginal increase in the generosity of a political contribution schedule is characterised by 
diminishing returns.  For the environmental groups this, along with the fact that increasing the amount 
of their resources devoted to indirect lobbying causes their effective economic stake to fall; means that 
increasing indirect lobbying causes the marginal reduction in the effectiveness of their direct lobbying 
to rise.  On the other hand, the assumption that the effectiveness of their indirect lobbying is gradually 
eroded by the increasing difficulty involved in actually increasing bP, means that the marginal increase 
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in the effectiveness of their indirect lobbying will fall as it is increased.  The environmental groups, 
then, will engage in both indirect and direct lobbying (implying that LE>0), allocating their resources 
between the two such that these marginal effects are equalised. 
 The analysis regarding the allocation of resources between direct and indirect lobbying by the 
trading sector mirrors that above for the environmental groups.  It too will seek to equate the marginal 
effectiveness of direct lobbying with that of indirect lobbying.  However, this is made more complicated 
by the fact that it is a multi-goal interest group.  Its indirect lobbying is solely focused on the degree to 
which the plan is differentiated, because that is the only variable that the bureaucracy is concerned 
about; but its direct lobbying encompasses lobbying for both a lenient abatement burden and a higher 
degree of differentiation in the allocation of allowances.  It has been assumed, though, that the trading 
sector offers the government a political contribution schedule that encompasses both of these goals 
and that any marginal increase in contribution requires a favourable marginal change in both the 
abatement burden imposed and the degree to which the allocation of allowances in the plan is 
differentiated.  Analytically, then, this means that the marginal effectiveness of direct lobbying, 
regarding both of these variables, can be taken as a single value. 
 The marginal effectiveness of direct lobbying of the trading sector (MDET), regarding both the 
abatement burden it will bear and the degree to which allowance allocation is differentiated, is given 
by (10).  This is derived in the same way as (8) for the environmental groups, but with θ2 representing 
the values of b and d that maximises the overall political contributions, net of political damage 
amongst the public, to the government if only the bureaucracy, the environmental groups and the 
public are considered.   
 
( )
( )
( )
( )TTTTT LY
dd
LY
bbMDE Δ−Δ
−Δ=−Δ
−Δ= 22
** θθ
 
 
(10) 
 
 Similarly, the marginal effectiveness of indirect lobbying (MIET) is given by (11), in which θ2 
has the same interpretation as for (10).  As for the environmental groups, the marginal effectiveness of 
indirect lobbying is in turn dependent on the marginal effectiveness of the influence of another player – 
in this case, the bureaucracy. 
    
( )[ ]{ }
T
B
B
T L
dddWb
MIE Δ
−−Δ=
2'* θ
 
 
(11) 
 
 As the trading sector diverts resources from direct lobbying into indirect lobbying, the degree 
of differentiation in the allowance allocation in the plan desired by the bureaucracy, dB, is increased.  
This causes the marginal contribution from the bureaucracy for every degree of differentiation to rise, 
thereby causing the equilibrium degree of this differentiation to rise.  However, this influence is again 
eroded by the assumption that it becomes increasingly difficult to convince the bureaucracy that it 
should demand further increases in this differentiation because of its fear that it will not be able to 
cope with further complexity when it comes to implement and run the Scheme.  The marginal 
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effectiveness of indirect lobbying for the trading sector is positive, but gradually declines (i.e. 
but ).  On the other hand, and at the same time, diverting more resources away 
from direct lobbying causes the marginal effectiveness of direct lobbying to rise as fewer resources 
are being used for it.  The trading sector will continue to transfer resources until these two are equal. 
( ) 0.' >TMIE ( ) 0.'' <TMIE
 The crucial aspect of this analysis is that the marginal effectiveness of indirect lobbying 
declines more rapidly for the trading sector than it does for the environmental groups.  This 
observation can be made because the value of dB becomes rigid more quickly than the value of bP.  It 
is clearer for the bureaucracy that a high degree of differentiation in the allocation of allowances is in 
its interest and so it already demands a high degree of differentiation before the influence of the 
trading sector is brought to bear on it, meaning that there is relatively little willingness to further 
increase it.  In contrast, the public is not necessarily aware of the environmental costs and so there is 
much more scope for the environmental groups to cause the publicly-optimal abatement burden to 
rise.  As the marginal effectiveness of direct lobbying functions have been assumed to be the same for 
both the trading sector and the environmental groups, this means that the environmental groups will 
engage in more indirect lobbying than the trading sector, as illustrated by Figure 4. 
 
MDET = MDEE  
Marginal 
effectiveness 
MIEE  
MIET  
 
Amount of indirect 
lobbying 
LET  LEE  
Figure 4: Amount of indirect lobbying by the trading sector and the environmental groups 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
The intention of the present paper, as outlined in Section 1, is to analyse why allocation plans in the 
Scheme have been designed in the way they have, and to assess the role of the national bureaucracy 
in the design process.  The analysis so far has examined how the government makes its final decision 
regarding the design of the allocation plan; how lobbying by the players involved influences this 
decision; and how the players allocate their lobbying resources between the two types of lobbying.  
Regarding the first intention of the paper, then, this leaves one final question: what are the 
characteristics of the final design and do they conform to the designs that have actually been 
implemented in reality?  To answer this it is necessary to look at the determining equations of the two 
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plan characteristics that this paper is focusing on – (6) and (7) which are reproduced below for ease of 
analysis. 
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(6) 
( ) ( ) 0)(: '''* =−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+− dDdWY LYddWd TT TTBB  
 
(7) 
 
The analysis in Section 5 concluded that the environmental groups would devote more of their 
lobbying resources to indirect lobbying than would the trading sector: LE > LT.  This observation, along 
with the generalised assumption that the marginal welfare effect functions of changes in the 
abatement burden are of equal magnitudes for both the environmental groups and the trading sector, 
means that the effective economic stake of the trading sector in the abatement burden decision is 
greater than that of the environmental groups: ( ) )('' bW
Y
LYbW
Y
LY
E
E
EE
T
T
TT ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − .  This, in turn, means 
that the equilibrium abatement burden imposed on the trading sector will be less than the publicly-
optimal abatement burden that now incorporates concerns about the environmental costs of CO2 
emissions due to the indirect lobbying of the environmental groups: b* < bP.  This prediction is 
precisely confirmed by experience – the allocation plans of the member states of the EU have tended 
to be more lenient on the trading sector than is economically efficient – i.e. than that necessary to 
secure environmental benefits in the least-costly fashion. 
The influence of the bureaucracy on the degree to which the plan is differentiated, in (7), is for 
the differentiation in allowance allocation not to deviate from dB, which has been inflated by the 
lobbying effect of the trading sector.  The influences of the trading sector and the public are in conflict: 
that of the first is for the degree of differentiation to exceed dB and that of the second is for it to be less 
than dB.  It has been assumed throughout the analysis that the players’ influences are of equal 
magnitudes and so, as LT > 0 (meaning that the effective economic stake of the trading sector in this 
decision is less than that of the public), the equilibrium degree of differentiation will be dB < d* < 0.  
There is pressure for the plan to exhibit differentiation but that this is moderated by the influence of the 
public.  A limitation of this analysis is that it fails to identify the economically efficient degree to which 
the allowance allocation in these plans should be differentiated and so it cannot compare the predicted 
value to this.  However, despite this, the prediction of the model is confirmed by the experiences of the 
Scheme in reality: the plans have tended to exhibit previously unexpected degrees of differentiation 
and complexity. 
Regarding the second intention of the paper, it is clear that the bureaucracy, and in particular 
its function in the first stage of the design process, plays a key role in determining the final design of 
the plan.  Figure 5 is similar to Figure 3 in that it shows the final design characteristics chosen.  The 
difference is that, whereas Figure 3 was general, Figure 5 represents the outcome that the model in 
this paper predicts: with the final plan being characterised by a relatively lenient abatement burden 
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imposed on the trading sector and a relatively high degree of differentiation in the allocation of 
allowances. 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted plan design 
Abatement 
burden, b 
Plan differentiation, d 
1 2 
3 
4 
1 = b*, d* 
2 = bθ1, dθ1
3 = bθ2, dθ2     
4 = bθ3, dθ3   
C(T) 
C(B) 
C(E) 
C(T) = Contribution of trading sector  
C(B) = Contribution of bureaucracy 
C(E) = Contribution of environmental groups   
 
The bureaucracy will inevitably be the body to implement, run and monitor the Scheme and so will 
inevitably lobby the government for there to be a greater degree of differentiation in the allocation of 
allowances within the plan.  However, if the design process is formulated such that the public has a 
voice in the generation of the design recommendations or if the bureaucracy was relinquished of the 
task of developing the recommendations (by delegating it to a body that will not subsequently run and 
monitor the Scheme – a committee of independent analysts, for example), then the influences of both 
the bureaucracy and the trading sector would be ameliorated, causing the final design to be 
characterised by an abatement burden closer to bP (i.e. an increased burden) and a degree of 
differentiation in the allocation of allowances further from dB (i.e. a less differentiated plan).  These are 
outcomes that could improve the economic efficiency of the Scheme. 
This is an important observation that should inform the design of all public policy – not just that 
directed towards environmental ends.  The influence of the bureaucracy can be significant, particularly 
if it is able to interact positively with that of another influential interest group (in this case the trading 
sector) in a way that there can effectively be a division of labour in the lobbying process that 
maximises the influence that they can bring to bear on the ultimate decision makers.  Svendsen 
(2003) suggests that all bureaucratic departments seek to maximise the cost of policies that they will 
subsequently be responsible for, as this secures their job-security and enhances their status.  The 
present paper has, for reasons of parsimony, focused on a single bureaucratic department, but 
Svendsen notes that the situation in which numerous departments compete with one another for 
status and security can be modelled as a tragedy of the commons problem (Hardin, 1968): each 
department seeking to secure as much of the public budget as it can.  This competition is most clearly 
illustrated by Irish experiences of allocation plan design: resources given to the Environment 
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Protection Agency (the lead department in the design) were directly taken from other bureaucratic 
departments (Barry, 2007).  Such competition serves to raise the overall public budget until all net 
benefit from the budgetary resources is eliminated: too much tax revenue is raised to fund 
bureaucratic rent-seeking (see Krueger, 1974 for the first exposition of rent-seeking). 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Throughout the paper, assumptions have been made to maximise the generality of the analysis: it has 
been assumed that each of the players, including the public, have the same level of influence on the 
government; and that all those able to lobby have the same endowment of lobbying resources at their 
disposal.  The fact that the model presented, with these general assumptions, generates predictions 
regarding these two characteristics of allocation plans that are confirmed by actual experience is a 
significant strength of it.  These assumptions can be relaxed to make the analysis more realistic in 
three ways.  Firstly, evidence shows that the trading sector has a much greater endowment of 
lobbying resources at its disposal than the environmental groups, and so the effective economic stake 
of the trading sector could be more highly weighted than that of the environmental groups.  Secondly, 
the public choice literature suggests that the influence of the public is much more limited than that of 
the lobbying groups because of the nature of the public being an unorganised population.  Finally, as 
the government has specifically delegated the role of developing design recommendations to the 
bureaucracy, it should perhaps be given a greater effective economic stake as the government more 
highly values its recommendations.  All three of these improvements to the realism of the model 
simply serve to strengthen the predictions: the abatement burden imposed on the trading sector will be 
lower, and the degree of differentiation in the allocation of allowances greater, than that currently 
predicted by the model. 
The paper has presented a plausible explanation as to why the allocation plans in the Scheme 
have taken the forms that they have done; has incorporated the role of the bureaucracy within this; 
and, perhaps most importantly, has demonstrated that the role of the bureaucracy in the design of 
allocation plans may be highly significant.  The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that the role of 
the bureaucracy should be taken into consideration when designing environmental policies and 
perhaps such policies would be more efficient if the body that subsequently implements and monitors 
them were not given such a great responsibility in determining their design: this would avoid 
bureaucratic rent-seeking. 
From a theoretical standpoint, future work would be beneficially directed towards developing a 
political economy model that allows predicted policy design outcomes to be compared to the 
endogenously determined economically efficient outcomes.  The model presented in this paper should 
be seen as a positive step towards that goal.  From an empirical standpoint, future work would be 
beneficially directed towards creating a dataset that can be used to empirically evaluate the influence 
of national bureaucracies, and private lobbying by other stakeholders, in the determination of 
environmental policy.  The author has spent many an hour searching for such data to facilitate the 
empirical evaluation of this model, but without success.  It is important that economic theory is 
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falsifiable and so this should be a priority for those working along the boundary of environmental 
economics and political economy. 
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